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ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING 
SEPTEMBER 11: A RETURN TO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The era that dawned on September 11, and the war against terrorism that 
has pervaded the sinews of our national life since that day, are reflected in 
thousands of ways in legislative and national policy, the habits of daily living, 
and our collective psyches.”1  In the wake of September 11, 2001, a war 
against terrorism was declared not only in Afghanistan, but also on our own 
soil against hundreds of Arab and Muslim nationals living “illegally” in the 
United States.  As of December 2001, the Justice Department had detained 
more than seven hundred people on immigration charges in connection with 
the September 11 attacks.2  The vast majority of the deportation hearings 
concerning these detainees have taken place behind closed doors pursuant to an 
order issued by the office of the Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, 
known as the “Creppy Directive.”3  The Creppy Directive has caused 
innumerable problems for the media groups seeking access to deportation 
proceedings.  Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft4 and North Jersey Media Group, 
Inc. v. Ashcroft5 represent two of these disputes. 
Despite very similar reasoning, the two courts responsible for adjudicating 
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group split on the issue of whether 
the First Amendment affords a right of access to deportation proceedings.  The 
Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press, concluded that the First Amendment 
undoubtedly protects public access to deportation proceedings.6  Judge Keith 
declared, “Today, the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard away from 
the public by placing its actions beyond public scrutiny.”7  The Third Circuit, 
in North Jersey Media Group, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and concluded 
that the First Amendment does not provide a right of access to deportation 
 
 1. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 2. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2002). 
 3. Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation 
Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431, 1442 (2003). 
 4. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 5. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 6. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
 7. Id. at 683. 
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proceedings.8  The Third Circuit based this conclusion on the government’s 
interest in protecting national security.9  Although the two circuits engaged in 
ideological warfare when weighing national security against freedom of 
information and access, a deeper, legal question emerged regarding the 
application of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of public access 
to judicial proceedings. 
Many scholars have accurately characterized the Supreme Court’s right of 
access precedent as confusing and ambiguous.10  After years of denying that a 
constitutional right of access existed, the Supreme Court first announced that 
the First Amendment protects access to information in criminal trials in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.11  In this opinion, the Court framed a 
two-part “experience and logic” analysis to provide lower courts with guidance 
concerning the right of access included in the First Amendment.12  Although 
the Court firmly established the two-pronged test in several cases following 
Richmond Newspapers, it has failed to crystallize many important aspects of 
that analysis.  The ambiguity inherent in the Richmond Newspapers analysis is 
evidenced by uncertainty and inconsistency in the lower courts.13  The 
uncertainty of the Richmond Newspapers analysis is the most damaging during 
times of national stress and insecurity.  “[A] rule that limits a judge’s 
discretion in deciding questions of core values can better preserve those values 
during times of stress when pressures may affect proper decision making.”14 
It is therefore essential that the judiciary identify the “core values” under 
which the First Amendment right of access is to operate.  The core values of 
the right of access can be identified through a closer analysis of the foundation 
for that right.  Richmond Newspapers defined the right of access as necessary 
to the structural interpretation of the First Amendment.15  For the First 
Amendment to fulfill its purpose in fostering informed public debate, the 
people must have access to information.16  This right must have practical 
limitations of “experience and logic” to assure that public access will not 
unduly interfere with government functions.17  When one considers the current 
 
 8. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204-05. 
 9. See id. at 217. 
 10. Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 461, 485 (2002); see also Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to the “Right 
to Know”?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1987). 
 11. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
 12. See id. at 588-89 (Brennan J., concurring). 
 13. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 
681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 14. Olson, supra note 10, at 488. 
 15. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. at 587. 
 17. Id. at 588-89. 
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question of access to deportation proceedings in light of this substantive 
principle, it is clear that Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond 
Newspapers principles correctly in Detroit Free Press.  The opinion issued by 
Judge Keith affirmatively protects First Amendment rights while considering 
the various implications of access on national security. 
This issue will be explored as follows: Part II will introduce the reader to 
the background principles and policy surrounding the First Amendment right 
of access.  Part III will discuss the Third and Sixth Circuits’ application of the 
Richmond Newspapers analysis in North Jersey Media Group and Detroit Free 
Press.  Part IV will discuss the constitutionality of the Creppy Directive in 
light of the fundamental interests of the Richmond Newspapers analysis.  Next, 
Part V will demonstrate that the Richmond Newspapers test is applicable to 
deportation proceedings.  Finally, Part VI will conclude that the First 
Amendment does support a qualified right of access to deportation 
proceedings. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Humble Beginnings of a Press Right of Access Under the First 
Amendment 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized several rights under the 
First Amendment, including the right of the press to publish and release 
information freely without interference from the government as well as a right 
of access to information.  Neither right is explicitly granted through the 
language of the First Amendment; rather, they are considered fundamental to 
the operation of rights enumerated in the First Amendment.18  While the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the right to send information without 
government interference as fundamental under the First Amendment, the right 
of access has not been given the same priority.19 
In the case of New York Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
refused to allow the government to restrict publication of sensitive materials.20  
In June 1971, the New York Times and the Washington Post began to publish a 
series of articles based on sensitive government documents surrounding the 
war in Vietnam.21  The United States government sought to prohibit any 
further publication of the documents, arguing that the publication would be 
against the interests of national security.22  The New York Times argued that 
 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575; Hayes, 
supra note 10, at 1113. 
 19. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1111. 
 20. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 718. 
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the documents contained materials that were largely historical and that 
prevention of the publication of these articles was nothing more than prior 
restraint.23  The Supreme Court, agreeing with the New York Times, stated that 
“‘[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a 
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’”24  The Court then 
noted, “The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification 
for the imposition of such restraint.’”25  The Court subsequently found that the 
government had not satisfied that burden and therefore could not prevent the 
publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers.26  In retrospect, it seems that the 
opinion in New York Times indicated that the Supreme Court would be 
extremely wary of any government attempt to restrict publication of any 
information, even in cases implicating national security.  Therefore, it was 
widely accepted after New York Times that any system of prior restraint would 
have to bear “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”27 
In light of the Supreme Court’s vigilance against prior restraint, it seemed 
that members of the press would have an unlimited and unalienable right to 
publish information whenever and however they deemed appropriate.  While in 
theory it was true that members of the media could publish whatever they 
desired, the government and the court system controlled the right to publish by 
limiting press access to information.28  Although New York Times protected the 
press’s right to publish information, the opinion does not require that the 
government give the press access to that information.  The right of access 
under the First Amendment developed slowly and is currently more limited 
and less developed than the right of the press to publish any information that 
they freely obtain.  In fact, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a First 
Amendment right of access until 1980, when the Court decided Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.29 
For the majority of the 1970s, the Court refused to disallow any 
government policy that limited press access to information.  The judiciary 
ignored pleas from the media as well as a change in public opinion demanding 
 
 23. See Rowena Scott Comegys, Note & Comment, Potter Stewart: An Analysis of His 
Views on the Press as Fourth Estate, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157, 194 (1982). 
 24. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963)). 
 25. Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Olson, supra note 10, at 474.  “Rather than limit what information the press could 
print, . . . trial judges began to limit what information the press could gather by closing 
courtrooms.”  Id.  In light of the decision in N.Y. Times, the courts were very limited in their right 
to restrict publication of information that the media obtained.  The court system retained the right 
to close its doors to the media and therefore restricted publication by restricting their access to the 
proceedings.  Id. 
 29. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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access to government information.30  The Watergate scandal created an 
atmosphere of distrust and discontent among the public that lead to a demand 
for information and government accountability.31  While the Court refused to 
confront the issue of press access directly, the media found some potential for 
judicial support in the case of Branzburg v. Hayes.32  Branzburg involved 
several claims in which reporters were subpoenaed to appear in front of a 
grand jury to reveal their sources.  The reporters claimed that they would suffer 
a severe burden if forced to reveal their sources and therefore should have a 
“special privilege” allowing them to keep such information secret.33  Without 
that privilege, the reporters claimed, they would be unable to effectively report 
information because current and future sources would be unwilling to reveal 
information.34  The Court refused to recognize a special reporter privilege, 
emphasizing that “‘the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from 
the application of general laws.’”35   
Despite the Court’s general disapproval of a reporter’s privilege, the 
majority opinion contained language indicating that the rights of the press 
extended to more than the right to report information that was obtained from a 
willing speaker.36  The Court stated, “Nor is it suggested that news gathering 
does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”37 
Despite the encouraging language included in the Branzburg opinion, the 
Court denied that the First Amendment included a special privilege for the 
press or a right to free access in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.38  In Houchins, the 
 
 30. See Hayes, supra note 10, at 1114-15. 
 31. Andrew Robert Schein, Attorney Fees for Pro Se Plaintiffs Under the Freedom of 
Information and Privacy Acts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 443, 443 (1983). 
 32. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 33. See id. at 680-81. 
 34. Id. at 682. 
 35. Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). 
 36. Id. at 681-682. 
 37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.  In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10 (1978), the 
Court rejected the media’s argument that the dictum used in Branzburg should be applied to 
provide a right of access.  The Court read the dictum as providing the press with an “undoubted 
right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law,’” but that it provides no support 
for the contention that the government must affirmatively supply information to the media.  
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82).  The language and holding in 
Branzburg is decidedly against the interests of the press, and therefore, the argument made by the 
Court in Houchins seems to make sense.  However, subsequent opinions that expanded the right 
of access relied on this language to support their majority opinions that assert that the First 
Amendment supports a right of access.  See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 576-77, 580 (1980). 
 38. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16.  It is important to note that the decision in Houchins relied 
on the interpretation of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment.  Id. at 14.  In making their 
argument, the press relied on the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment to gain access above 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1106 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1101 
Court approached the question of “whether the news media have a 
constitutional right of access to a county jail . . . to interview inmates and make 
sound recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broadcasting by 
newspapers[,] radio and television.”39  KQED, an operator of television and 
radio stations, requested permission to inspect and photograph the Greystone 
prison facility in California.40  After prison officials refused, KQED filed suit 
alleging that Houchins, the sheriff in charge of access to the facilities, had 
violated the First Amendment by refusing to permit access.41  KQED 
maintained that Houchins’s refusal to allow access was effectively a failure to 
“provide any effective means by which the public could be informed of 
conditions prevailing in the Greystone facility or learn of the prisoners’ 
grievances.”42 
The Court held that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources 
of information within the government’s control.”43  Chief Justice Burger made 
an important distinction in his majority opinion between a right of access and a 
First Amendment right to publish and disseminate information to the public.  
Houchins affirmed the position that the Court will not limit the right of the 
press to publish any information obtained in regard to the prison facility or its 
prisoners;44 however, the opinion made it clear that the right to disseminate 
information is far different from the right to have free access to that 
information.45  The Court noted that, while the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from limiting the publication of information obtained, the First 
Amendment does not require the government to provide information for 
publication.  The Court noted, “We must not confuse what is ‘good,’ 
‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ with what is constitutionally commanded by the 
 
and beyond that which was allowed to the general public.  Later cases such as Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), rely on the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment in granting both the public and the press access to 
criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76.  The press did not 
seek a right of access greater than that of the general public.  Instead, the Court determined that 
the press should be granted a right of access as a catalyst to the public.  See id. at 572-73.  The 
press plays a considerable role in informing the public.  Id. 
 39. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 3-4. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. at 15. 
 44. Houchins, 428 U.S. at 14.  The Court determined that the prison facility “cannot prevent 
respondents from learning about jail conditions in a variety of ways, albeit not as conveniently as 
they might prefer.  Respondents have a First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates 
criticizing jail officials and reporting on conditions.”  Id. at 15. 
 45. Id. at 12. 
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First Amendment.”46  The ground for rejection of a right of access is founded 
on the principle that the basic goal of the First Amendment is to have the 
freedom to communicate and publish information.47  While the Court 
acknowledged that a “special privilege” of access might be desirable, it was 
not, in the Court’s eyes, essential to this freedom; therefore, it is not mandated 
by the First Amendment.48  The First Amendment would not be construed to 
compel the government to hand over the information for publication, but it 
would preclude the government from preventing publication after its receipt.49 
Following the Court’s analysis in Houchins, the media temporarily turned 
their attention away from the First Amendment and chose instead to base their 
argument for open access on the Sixth Amendment.  The media considered the 
Sixth Amendment to be a more fruitful source for those members of the media 
trying to gain access to closed criminal proceedings.  The Sixth Amendment 
states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial.”50  In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, the media argued 
that the Sixth Amendment literally requires judges to open pretrial criminal 
proceedings to the public as well as to the press.51 
In Gannett, the owner of a local newspaper challenged a court order 
excluding the public and the press from a pretrial suppression hearing in a 
murder case.52  The defendants requested that the court exclude members of 
the press and the public from the pretrial hearing after expressing concern that 
the media circus had already jeopardized their right to a fair trial and further 
publicity might aggravate an intense situation.53  The Supreme Court disagreed 
with the media’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, concluding instead 
that the Sixth Amendment provides a right that is personal to the criminal 
defendant.54  Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned that “[t]he 
Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the 
part of the public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the 
accused.”55  The Court explained further that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a right of an accused to a public trial but does not guarantee that right to the 
public or the press.56  The Court refused to recognize a right of access under 
the Sixth Amendment, but suggested that it might revisit the question of 
 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. See id. at 12. 
 48. Id. at 11-12. 
 49. Houchins, 428 U.S. at 12. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend VI (emphasis added). 
 51. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93 (1979). 
 52. Id. at 375. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 379-80. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380-83. 
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whether the First Amendment protects a right of access.57  The Court candidly 
revealed that, “even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations,” it did not feel 
compelled to decide such a question in this particular case.58  Therefore, it was 
uncertain whether the Court would consider a First Amendment right of the 
press and the public to criminal proceedings in the future. 
In light of the fact that the Court refused to recognize a First Amendment 
right of access to hearings and governmental institutions in Houchins, it seems 
odd that a year later the Court would refuse to address this seemingly settled 
issue in Gannett.59  Gannett brought hope to the media—who, until this point, 
had been discouraged in their pursuit of a judicially-recognized right of access 
to information—that the Court would recognize such a right to access.  The 
question the Court left open in Gannett would be answered just a year later in 
Richmond Newspapers. 
B. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
Following the Court’s decision in Gannett, trial judges quickly took 
advantage of the decision that precluded any successful Sixth Amendment 
claim of access and proceeded to close their doors to the public and the press.60  
Throughout the 1970s, the Court denied any press claim that the First 
Amendment required the government to provide information to the press;61 
however, the Court’s purposeful oversight of the First Amendment question in 
Gannett infuriated the media.62  The media found their answer when the Court 
supported a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond 
Newspapers.63  “[I]n one of the more remarkable and unanticipated turnabouts 
on the Court, an unconsolidated majority adopted a variation of the so-called 
structural theory to recognize for the first time a First Amendment-based 
affirmative right of public access to criminal trial proceedings.”64  The basis of 
all future decisions expanding the right of access to government proceedings is 
 
 57. See id. at 392. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Olson, supra note 10, at 475-76. 
 61. Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse:” The First Amendment Right of Access 
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995). 
 62. See Olson, supra note 10 at 475; Beth Hornbuckle Fleming, Comment, First Amendment 
Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 32 EMORY L.J. 619, 621 (1983). 
 63. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980). 
 64. Cerruti, supra note 61, at 238. 
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founded in the structure and language of the Court’s decision in Richmond 
Newspapers.65 
The Court initially intended to answer the “narrow question . . . [of] 
whether the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed 
under the United States Constitution.”66  In the end, the Court would establish 
the foundation for the current state of public access to government information.  
The groundbreaking decision of Richmond Newspapers began in the context of 
a highly-publicized murder trial in Virginia.67  Before the defendant’s fourth 
trial for the same count, counsel for the defendant requested that the trial judge 
close the hearing to the public and the press amidst fears that members of the 
jury as well as potential witnesses were unfairly influenced by the media 
attention.68  The trial judge relied on a Virginia statute that gave him the power 
to close the courtroom to the press and the public absent any objections from 
either party.69  Several newspapers, including Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 
objected to the order closing the hearing.70  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of Richmond Newspapers after the Supreme Court of 
Virginia refused to hear the case.71 
Although the Court was in general agreement that the First Amendment 
provided a right of access for the press and the public, the Justices disagreed as 
to the scope and the significance of that right.72 Only eight Justices participated 
 
 65. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I); Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Sup. Ct, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 66. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558. 
 67. Id. at 559. 
 68. Id. at 559-60. 
 69. Id. at 560.  The trial judge was presumably referring to VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-266 
(Supp. 1980), which states: 
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the 
court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would 
impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial 
shall not be violated. 
VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-266.  It is interesting to note that the Court did not decide whether or not 
the Virginia Code upon which the trial judge relied was in and of itself unconstitutional.  
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562 n.4.  The Court maintained that the validity of the code 
“was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke our 
appellate jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 70. Id. at 560. 
 71. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562-63. 
 72. See id.  The Court was in general agreement despite a dissenting opinion written by 
Justice Rehnquist and multiple concurring opinions.  A majority of justices agreed that the press 
and the public should have access to the hearing, but some justices thought that the right should 
originate in the Sixth rather than the First Amendment.  See id. 
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in the case,73 but the Court produced six separate opinions, each offering an 
independent rationale concerning the nature and scope of the First Amendment 
right of access.  The two most notable opinions come from Justice Burger and 
Justice Brennan.74  Both opinions are valuable and significant in terms of 
future Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding a First Amendment right of 
access to government information.  While Justice Burger’s opinion was the 
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan’s concurring 
opinion proved to be more resilient in subsequent cases. 
Justice Burger chose to decide the very narrow question of the press’s right 
of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment.75  Justice Burger 
considered the question presented in Richmond Newspapers as one of first 
impression for the Court, noting that the cases of Gannett and Houchins were 
factually distinguishable because Richmond Newspapers was limited to the 
First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.76  The plurality of 
the Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the 
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, 
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of 
speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”77  This holding is primarily 
based on both the extensive history of public access to criminal trials as well as 
the people’s right to gain information regarding the functioning of their 
government.78 
Justice Burger placed primary emphasis on the long and continuous history 
of public and media access to criminal proceedings.79  He stated, 
“[T]hroughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who care to 
observe.”80  The First Amendment was enacted with this history of openness in 
mind.81 Open criminal trials are essential to ensuring that criminal 
“proceedings [are] conducted fairly to all concerned, [and to] . . . discourage[] 
 
 73. Justice Powell did not participate in the consideration or the decision in this case.  Id. at 
581.  Although Justice Powell did not participate in this particular decision, he undoubtedly 
supported a right of access under the First Amendment.  In both Gannett, Co. v. DePasquale, 444 
U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring), and Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) 
(Powell, J., dissenting), Powell supported a finding for a right of access to information from 
judicial proceedings.  In fact, of the eight remaining Justices who sat for the Richmond 
Newspapers case, only Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority that the First Amendment 
provided a right of access to criminal trials.  See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 604. 
 74. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in his well-written concurring opinion.  Id. at 
584. 
 75. Id. at 558. 
 76. Id. at 563-64. 
 77. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
 78. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
 79. Id. at 575. 
 80. Id. at 564. 
 81. Id. at 575. 
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perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or 
partiality.”82  Additionally, open criminal trials provide therapeutic value to a 
community as a method of dealing with those who committed criminal acts.83  
Justice Burger noted: 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.  
When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity 
both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular 
case . . . .84 
In light of the positive historical background of open criminal trials, Justice 
Burger explained, presumptive openness is inherent and necessary to the 
American system of justice.85 
The First Amendment prohibits the government from “abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the [g]overnment for a redress of grievances.”86  
According to Justice Burger, the freedoms expressly guaranteed in the First 
Amendment “share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”87  
Essentially, the Court indicated that it is necessary to allow people to gain 
access to information in order to protect their right to free speech.  Because of 
the long, uninterrupted history of access to trials, it is clear that criminal trials, 
especially the manner in which they are conducted, are an important aspect of 
the functioning of government.88  “In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of 
speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of 
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees.”89  
The public’s right of access, in Justice Burger’s opinion, should also extend to 
the press because people gain most of their information through the media.90  
Denying access to the press would inhibit the people from exercising their First 
Amendment rights because they would be unable to gain information about 
their government.  It is clear that the history of the openness of criminal trials 
was the defining factor in Justice Burger’s analysis.91 
 
 82. Id. at 569. 
 83. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. 
 84. Id. at 572. 
 85. Id. at 573. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 87. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 577 n.12. 
 91. Olson, supra note 10, at 477-78.  Compare Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 
596, 613 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that, based on historical evidence, criminal 
trials for sexual offenses involving victims who are minors are traditionally closed) with 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1112 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1101 
While Justice Burger’s historical analysis is important to future Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding the right of access under the First Amendment, 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers proved to be 
the more resilient.92  Unlike Justice Burger, Justice Brennan advocated a more 
expansive view of the First Amendment right of access and chose not to 
narrow that right to criminal cases.93  Justice Brennan asserted that the First 
Amendment plays a structural role in our society and is therefore an essential 
support of our republican system of government.94  “Implicit in this structural 
role is not only ‘the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but also the antecedent assumption that 
valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be 
informed.’”95  Essentially, Justice Brennan argued that the First Amendment 
must support the conditions that would lead to informed public debate in order 
to fulfill its structural role in the Constitution.96  This line of reasoning 
supports open access to information to educate the public and foster informed 
public debate. 
Justice Brennan acknowledged that an interpretation of the First 
Amendment along these lines would allow people to have access to a 
seemingly endless amount of government information.97  He argued that “‘the 
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless’ [so] it must be invoked with 
discrimination and temperance.”98  Justice Brennan formulated a two-pronged 
“experience and logic” test as a practical limit to this structural principle.99  A 
history, or “experience,” of public access to a particular proceeding is vital 
because: 
[T]he case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information.  
Such a tradition commands respect in part because the Constitution carries the 
gloss of history.  More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the 
favorable judgment of experience.100 
 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-80 (basing approval of First Amendment access to 
criminal trials on an uncontradicted common law history of access to proceedings). 
 92. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-06.  Justice Brennan, writing for the 
majority, formalized his structural interpretation of the First Amendment as well as his two-part 
“experience and logic” test.  Id.  He consistently cited to his concurring opinion in Richmond 
Newspapers.  Id. 
 93. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586. 
 94. Id. at 587. 
 95. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 96. See id. at 587-88. 
 97. Id. at 588. 
 98. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (citation omitted) (quoting William Brennan, 
Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979)). 
 99. Id. at 589. 
 100. Id. 
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If the First Amendment is to fulfill its structural role in providing the public 
with circumstances that support informed public debate, it seems clear that a 
favorable history of access would lend itself to that ideal.  The second, or 
“logic,” prong of the test is essential to limit access because practical 
considerations must be taken into account in each case before granting a right 
of access.101  It is important to analyze the specific benefits gained from access 
to the proceeding in question.102  “[W]hat is crucial [to the logic portion of the 
two-pronged analysis] in individual cases is whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of that very process.”103  With those 
words, Justice Brennan laid the foundation in support of a First Amendment 
right of access for subsequent right of access cases. 
C. Richmond Newspapers Gains New Ground: The Expansion of the Right of 
Access and the Addition of Strict Scrutiny 
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court decided its next right of 
access case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.104  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Brennan declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts law 
requiring judges to close the courtroom doors to the press and the public during 
the testimony of minor victims of sex offenses.105  In Globe Newspaper, 
Justice Brennan relied on his structural theory of the First Amendment from 
Richmond Newspapers as the source of the right of access.  He cited the 
Richmond Newspapers plurality for the proposition that “the ‘expressly 
guaranteed freedoms’ of the First Amendment ‘share a common core purpose 
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of 
government.’”106  Justice Brennan then declared, “Thus to the extent that the 
First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure 
that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an 
informed one.”107 
As noted in Richmond Newspapers, a right of access supported by a 
structural theory of the First Amendment could be seemingly endless.108  
Therefore, Justice Brennan returned to his two limiting principles, experience 
and logic, as practical limitations on that right.109  Justice Brennan, in writing 
for the majority, clearly stated that First Amendment access to criminal trials 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 104. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 105. Id. at 610-11. 
 106. Id. at 604 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575). 
 107. Id. at 604-05. 
 108. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 109. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. 
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does not depend on the context in which each particular case arises.110  For 
example, the fact that the criminal case in Globe Newspaper involved a minor 
sex-crime victim was not important to the First Amendment analysis.111  
Rather, a First Amendment right of access exists only if the experience and 
logic analysis lends favorably to open access on a case-by-case basis.112  
Justice Brennan used historical evidence articulated in Richmond Newspapers 
to conclude that criminal trials have traditionally been open to the public.113  
Second, the Court concluded that the logic prong lends favorably to open 
proceedings because “the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly 
significant role in the function[] of the judicial process and the government as a 
whole.”114  Therefore, Justice Brennan reaffirmed the application of the 
experience and logic analysis to determine that the media has a right of access 
to deportation proceedings. 
The groundbreaking aspect of Globe Newspaper is the addition of the 
“strict scrutiny” portion of the analysis.115  Although a court may determine 
that a fundamental right of access exists under the First Amendment, the right 
is not limitless.116  The government may still restrict access if the restriction 
passes the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.  The Court held that “it must be 
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling government interest and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”117  In Globe Newspaper, although 
the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of sex offenses was compelling, 
the Court determined that the mandatory closure rule was not narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest.118  The Court found blanket closures to be unnecessary 
because one could restrict access in a more narrow fashion by deciding on a 
case-by-case basis whether to close a particular hearing.119 
Globe Newspaper is exceedingly important because it offered lower courts 
guidance in how they should weigh competing interests in right of access 
cases.  “[A]fter Globe [Newspapers], many lower courts began using 
‘tradition’ and ‘contribution to function’ as a two-pronged standard for 
determining whether there was a right of access to government proceedings or 
information.”120  The decision also established a strict scrutiny standard in 
order to assess government restrictions on access to information and 
 
 110. Id. at 605 n.13. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 608-09. 
 113. Id. at 605. 
 114. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. 
 115. Id. at 606-07. 
 116. Id. at 606. 
 117. Id. at 607. 
 118. Id. at 607-08. 
 119. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608. 
 120. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1118. 
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proceedings that are protected by the First Amendment.121  Therefore, the 
Globe Newspaper decision did much to refine the standard originally set forth 
in Richmond Newspapers.  While relying on the reasoning set forth in his 
concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan gained a majority and 
redefined the existing confines of the right of access to government 
proceedings and information. 
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I), the Court found a First Amendment right of access to pretrial 
jury selection proceedings in a criminal case.122  Press-Enterprise I involved a 
challenge to a trial judge’s order to seal the transcript of jury selection 
proceedings in a criminal trial.123  Although the case took place in the criminal 
context, this was the first time that the Court chose to extend the right of access 
outside the context of a criminal trial.124  Despite the fact that the case involved 
a pre-trial jury selection proceeding rather than an actual criminal trial, the 
Court applied the two-prong Richmond Newspapers standard rather than 
Houchins.125  The majority opinion notably did not include a discussion on the 
constitutional source of a right of access.126  Assuming that Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper had sufficiently established the existence of 
a First Amendment right of access, the Court turned directly to the experience 
and logic inquiry to determine if the right existed in the case of pretrial jury 
selection proceedings.127  The Court articulated a history of access to pretrial 
jury selection dating back to the English common law and concluded that the 
long, continuous history of access to pretrial jury selection offered values 
similar to those present in a criminal trial.128  An open pretrial proceeding 
offered “community therapeutic value” and an assurance that the government 
was functioning properly.129 
After determining that the experience and logic portion of the test had been 
satisfied, the Court determined that the trial judge’s order was not narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling interest.130  The Court also required that the 
proponent of the restriction provide specific, particularized findings supporting 
the narrow-tailoring requirement.131  Although the government interest in 
closure was compelling in this case, the Court held that the trial judge’s broad 
 
 121. Id. at 1118-19. 
 122. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984). 
 123. Id. at 504-05. 
 124. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1119. 
 125. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509-10. 
 126. See id. at 503. 
 127. Id. at 505-08. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 508-09. 
 130. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513. 
 131. Id. at 510. 
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order closing the transcript was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.132  
The trial judge had failed to articulate specific findings to prove that the 
closure was narrowly tailored and also failed to consider alternatives to 
closure.133  Press-Enterprise I indicated that the Court would take great care to 
protect First Amendment rights when they are found to exist and demonstrated 
the Court’s willingness to apply the Richmond Newspapers standard outside 
the context of a criminal trial. 
D. The Current State of the Right of Access 
After the decision in Press-Enterprise I, the Court heard only one more 
case involving the right of access under the First Amendment.  In Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II), the Court held that the 
press and the public had a right to attend preliminary hearings in criminal 
cases.134  The case involved a challenge to an order closing transcripts of 
pretrial proceedings in highly-publicized cases.135  Despite the trial judge’s 
conclusion that much of the material included in the transcript was historical, 
the trial court concluded that the release of the transcript could jeopardize the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.136  The media filed a challenge to the order in 
state court, claiming that the closure was a violation of their First Amendment 
rights.137 
The Court applied the Richmond Newspapers standard to determine 
whether or not the First Amendment protected access to transcripts of 
preliminary hearings in criminal cases.138  First, the Court determined that the 
history of access to preliminary hearings satisfied the experience portion of the 
test.139  The significance of the Press Enterprise II opinion is its reliance on 
post-Bill of Rights history to support the experience portion of the Richmond 
Newspapers standard.  Previous Supreme Court cases that dealt with the 
experience portion of the two-prong test had articulated historical evidence of 
openness dating back to English common law.140  The Supreme Court had not 
yet articulated specific guidelines concerning the extent of history necessary to 
pass the experience portion of the test.  If a proceeding lacked an extensive 
history of openness, it was uncertain whether the Court would consider the 
 
 132. Id. at 513. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986). 
 135. Id. at 5. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 8. 
 139. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-11. 
 140. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (providing a history of 
openness to criminal proceedings dating back to the Norman Conquest); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (same). 
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experience sufficient.  Press-Enterprise II suggested that a history of openness 
dating back to English common law was unnecessary when the Court relied 
upon nineteenth and twentieth century history to satisfy the experience portion 
of the test.141  Following this decision, many believed that the history need not 
be as extensive as the history described in Richmond Newspapers.142  Next, the 
Court concluded that the logic portion of the two-prong test had been satisfied 
because the traditional access to preliminary proceedings in criminal cases has 
had a positive effect on pretrial proceedings by acting as a safeguard against 
overzealous prosecution and providing an outlet for public observation.143  
After determining that both portions of the experience and logic test had been 
satisfied, the Court determined that the order failed under strict scrutiny.144  
Specifically, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to articulate valid 
reasons for closing the transcript.145  The Court noted, “The First Amendment 
right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity 
might deprive the defendant of that right.”146 
Following Press-Enterprise II, it became clear that a reviewing court must 
first determine whether the particular proceeding passes the experience and 
logic test articulated in Richmond Newspapers.  If the reviewing court 
determines that the proceeding in question does not pass the experience and 
logic test, then the First Amendment does not support a right of access in that 
particular proceeding.147  If, alternatively, the reviewing court determines that 
the proceeding does pass the experience and logic test, the public and the press 
will enjoy a qualified right of access to that particular proceeding.  The 
government might still restrict access to a proceeding if it has a compelling 
reason and the limitation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.148 
Although Press-Enterprise II provided a definitive procedure by which 
right of access cases are to be determined, the Court’s right of access cases left 
many open questions for the lower courts to consider.  First, the Court never 
explicitly overruled the decision in Houchins.149  Decisions following 
 
 141. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10-11. 
 142. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 10, at 485-86. 
 143. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13. 
 144. Id. at 13-15. 
 145. Id. at 14-15. 
 146. Id. at 15. 
 147. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 148. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14. 
 149. There is some evidence that the Court still considers Houchins to be good law.  Los 
Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), dealt with the 
constitutionality of a California statute that regulates the circumstances under which a publisher 
can obtain information.  The press argued that the law violated the First Amendment because it 
limited access to government information.  Id. at 34.  The Court stated, “California could decide 
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Houchins failed to provide any guidance as to how to resolve the inconsistency 
in Supreme Court precedent.150  Therefore, lower courts have struggled with 
the application of Richmond Newspapers and Houchins.151  Second, “[t]he 
Court’s ambiguity about the relative importance of the two prongs and its lack 
of guidance regarding the extent of the right or its application to proceedings 
beyond criminal trials has led to an inconsistent application of the doctrine.”152  
The ambiguous nature of the two-part test is evidenced by the recent debate 
regarding access to deportation proceedings. 
III.  THE CIRCUITS SPLIT: DETROIT FREE PRESS V. ASHCROFT AND NORTH JERSEY 
MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT 
Following September 11, 2001, the United States government was forced 
to take a fresh look at immigration and national security.  After only a few 
months, the government had arrested hundreds of foreign-born nationals on 
immigration charges.153  The government was fearful that certain aliens 
“‘might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist 
activities against the United States.’”154  Fearful that the deportation hearings 
would be used to reveal information regarding the investigation of the 
September 11 attacks as well as information regarding national security 
measures, the Attorney General argued that these hearings should be closed in 
“special interest” cases.155  Pursuant to the order issued by the Attorney 
General, Judge Michael Creppy issued the Creppy Directive, ordering the 
broad closure of hundreds of special interest immigration hearings taking place 
throughout the United States.156  Under this directive, Judge Creppy excluded 
 
not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment.”  Id. at 40.  The 
Court used Houchins to support this proposition.  Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 151. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit 
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 152. Olson, supra note 10, at 485. 
 153. Cole, supra note 2, at 961. 
 154. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 (quoting statement of Dale L. Watson, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and 
Counterintelligence). 
 155. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705. 
 156. Cohen, supra note 3, at 1442.  In fact, the Attorney General, in cooperation with the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, closed every deportation hearing that posed even the 
slightest potential national security concern in connection with the September 11 attacks.  N. 
Jersey Media Group, 303 F.3d at 202-03.  These cases were closed to the public to keep our 
enemies from becoming aware of the cases that were closed.  Id. at 203.  By closing unrelated 
cases, Ashcroft determined that our enemies would be unable to deduce who was being deported 
in a closed hearing.  Id.  In North Jersey Media Group, Judge Becker went into great detail 
regarding the authority of, and the sources of authority for, the Creppy Directive.  The Third 
Circuit stated: 
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the release of information concerning the trial and closed the doors to the 
public in hearings for special interest detainees.157 
Several newspapers came forward shortly following the Creppy Directive 
claiming that the First Amendment protected access to deportation 
proceedings.  Two cases reached the federal appellate level in both the Sixth 
and Third Circuits.  While both Circuits determined that Richmond 
Newspapers was the appropriate analysis, the circuits disagreed as to whether 
or not the First Amendment protected access to deportation proceedings.  
Judge Keith, writing the majority opinion in Detroit Free Press, announced, 
“The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, 
and behind a closed door.  Democracies die behind closed doors.”158  Judge 
Becker, writing the opinion in North Jersey Media Group, declared, “We are 
keenly aware of the dangers presented by deference to the executive branch 
when constitutional liberties are at stake, especially in times of national 
crisis.”159  However, Judge Becker disagreed with Judge Keith, concluding that 
“[o]n balance, . . . we are unable to conclude that openness plays a positive role 
in special interest deportation hearings at a time when our nation is faced with 
threats of such profound and unknown dimension.”160  It is clear that fear of 
terrorism and national security concerns were key to Judge Becker’s support of 
the Creppy Directive in North Jersey Media Group.  While concern for the 
national security of our country is understandable and important, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding the right of access clearly does not support a 
denial of First Amendment protection. 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act charges the Attorney General with the 
“administration and enforcement” of “all [ ] laws relating to the immigration and 
nationalization of aliens.”  The Act authorizes the Attorney General to remove aliens from 
the United States for various reasons, including violation of the immigration laws.  It also 
permits him to prescribe “such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his 
authority,” and provides for removal proceedings to be conducted by immigration judges 
within the Executive Branch “under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” 
  Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General in 1964 promulgated a regulation 
governing public access to removal and other administrative hearings that has remained 
substantially unchanged.  It mandates the closure of certain hearings, such as those 
involving abused alien children, and permits the closure of all other hearings to protect 
“witnesses, parties, or the public interest.”  The Creppy Directive was issued pursuant to 
this regulation. 
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 
1231 (1994) and 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2002)). 
 157. Susan Sachs, Ashcroft Petitions Justices For Secrecy in Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2002, at A9. 
 158. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683. 
 159. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220. 
 160. Id. 
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A. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 
Several local newspapers and members of the public were denied access to 
Rabih Haddad’s deportation hearings after Immigration Judge Elizabeth 
Hacker announced the closure of the hearing.161  Haddad, several newspapers 
and Congressman John Conyers (collectively known as “the newspapers”) 
filed complaints for injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the Creppy 
Directive’s blanket closure of all deportation proceedings in special interest 
cases violated the First Amendment.162  The District Court granted the 
newspapers’ motion, finding that the First Amendment protected access to 
deportation proceedings.163  The court found a qualified First Amendment right 
based on an application of the Richmond Newspapers standard and held that 
the Creppy Directive unduly restricted protected access because it was not 
narrowly tailored to serve the interests of national security.164 
1. Applicability of Richmond Newspapers 
The government considered the fact that the Supreme Court failed to 
overturn its decision in Houchins as an opportunity to argue before the Court 
of Appeals against application of the Richmond Newspapers standard.165  The 
Attorney General argued that the Richmond Newspapers standard should not 
extend to deportation hearings because they are entirely administrative in 
nature.166  In the government’s view, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
conferring a right of access had been limited to judicial proceedings.167  In 
rejecting this argument, Judge Keith found that, although they might be 
administrative, deportation hearings have quasi-judicial characteristics.168 
There is ample evidence that the Supreme Court will look to the 
adjudicative aspects of a particular administrative proceeding in reaching its 
 
 161. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 164. Id. at 947. 
 165. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  Judge Keith, writing for the Sixth Circuit, pointed out that Houchins might no longer 
be a viable standard.  First, the decision in Houchins was not a majority, but rather a plurality, 
decision for the Court.  Id.  Only seven of the nine justices took part in the decision, and therefore 
it cannot be said that a majority either accepted or rejected the standard articulated in Houchins.  
Id. at 694 n.10.  Furthermore, the standard articulated in Richmond Newspapers has sufficiently 
addressed all of the concerns stated in Houchins regarding a First Amendment right of access.  Id. 
at 695.  Judge Keith argued against the viability of Houchins despite the Supreme Court’s prior 
reliance on the case.  Id.  However, Judge Keith maintained that Houchins might correctly be 
applied in other cases based on different facts and circumstances.  Id. at 694-95. 
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decisions regarding administrative proceedings.169  For instance, the Sixth 
Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Sims v. Apfel170 and 
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority171 in 
support of this proposition.172  In Sims, the Supreme Court held that a social 
security recipient need not exhaust all issues at the administrative hearing to 
preserve them for judicial review.173  In the Court’s view, proceedings before 
an administrative agency are not adversarial in nature and therefore are not 
necessarily subject to the same standards governing adversarial proceedings.174  
In contrast, in Federal Maritime Commission, the Court “held that state 
sovereign immunity bars an administrative agency from adjudicating 
complaints filed by a private party against a non-consenting state because . . . 
such administrative proceedings bore a striking resemblance to civil 
litigation.”175  Therefore, the bar against suing a state under the Eleventh 
Amendment was extended to administrative proceedings because the Court 
found that they were very much like judicial proceedings.176  The Sixth Circuit 
also cited one of its own prior cases, United States v. Miami University,177 
which held “that there was no First Amendment right to access a university’s 
student disciplinary board proceedings.”178  In that case, the Sixth Circuit 
based its conclusion on the fact that the administrative proceedings that were at 
issue in the case were not judicial in nature because they often did not embody 
the traditional notions of fair play.179  “‘[S]tudent disciplinary proceedings do 
not “afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-
examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify 
 
 169. See id. at 695-96.  The court rejected the idea that a line was drawn between 
administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings.  Id. at 695.  First of all, the Supreme Court 
has applied the Richmond Newspapers standard outside the context of judicial proceedings in 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986), Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).  See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695-96.  
The Sixth Circuit and other federal courts have applied this standard outside the context of 
judicial proceedings as well, and in some cases, the other federal courts have applied this standard 
to administrative proceedings.  Id. at 695.  Furthermore, the court does not believe that 
distinctions should be drawn between judicial and non-judicial proceedings for fear that it would 
allow the legislature to “artfully craft information out of the public eye.”  Id. at 696. 
 170. 530 U.S. 103 (2000). 
 171. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 172. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696-97. 
 173. Sims, 530 U.S. at 112. 
 174. Id. at 109-111. 
 175. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 697 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756-61). 
 176. See id. 
 177. 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 178. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 697 (citing Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 824). 
 179. Id. 
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his version of the incident.’”180  The Sixth Circuit relied on this precedent to 
support the contention that Richmond Newspapers should apply to deportation 
hearings because the hearings are quasi-judicial.181 
The characteristics of deportation proceedings support the contention that 
they are in fact quasi-judicial proceedings.182  The government must issue a 
“Notice to Appear,” a charging document served to the deportee under 
circumstances similar to those required for complaints in judicial 
proceedings.183  Additionally, respondents in deportation proceedings may 
offer affirmative defenses, have a right to habeas corpus relief, have a right to 
be represented by counsel, and have a right to be present at the hearing.184  
Additionally, respondents have the right to examine and object to evidence 
used against them, present evidence on their own behalf, and cross-examine 
witnesses presented by the government.185  The role of immigration judges 
provides further evidence of the judicial nature of deportation proceedings.  
Although immigration judges are not Article III judges,186 the role that they 
play in presiding over immigration hearings is very similar to the way in which 
Article III judges preside over criminal and civil proceedings.  Most 
importantly, the immigration judge does not participate in the investigative 
aspects of the administrative proceedings; rather, the immigration judge is to 
serve an impartial role in presiding over deportation proceedings.187  
Deportation proceedings are adjudicative, quasi-judicial proceedings and 
should be afforded First Amendment protection. 
2. Application of the Two-Pronged Richmond Newspapers Test 
The right of access under the First Amendment is a qualified right that is 
limited by practical considerations of experience and logic.188  Relying on 
Richmond Newspapers, the central question in both North Jersey Media Group 
and Detroit Free Press is therefore whether or not deportation hearings carry a 
 
 180. Id. (quoting Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 822 (quoting Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 
(1975))). 
 181. See id. at 698. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 698. 
 184. Id. at 698-99. 
 185. Id. at 699. 
 186. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  In addition to granting Congress the power to create lower 
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agency hearing.  See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699. 
 187. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699. 
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“tradition of accessibility” and whether that tradition has had a favorable 
impact on society.189 
a. The Experience Prong 
In Detroit Free Press, the court concluded that there is a presumptive right 
of access under the experience and logic test.190  Richmond Newspapers 
requires a reviewing court to consider whether openness has proven to be a 
favorable experience.191  Therefore, Judge Keith considered “‘whether the 
place and process have historically been open to the press and general 
public.’”192  The newspapers arguing in support of access maintained that 
deportation proceedings had enjoyed a long, uncontradicted history of open 
access.193  The government attacked the newspapers’ argument that deportation 
hearings have been presumptively open.194  Specifically, the government 
argued: (1) that the history of openness of deportation hearings must date back 
to the common law tradition, and (2) that even if the court decided that the 
history of openness need not date back to the common law, deportation 
proceedings have not enjoyed the unambiguous presumption of openness 
necessary to satisfy Richmond Newspapers.195 
The government argued that Richmond Newspapers requires a common 
law history of openness in order to satisfy the historical prong of the 
experience test.196  Judge Keith relied on Press Enterprise II and concluded 
that common law history was unnecessary.197  “[A]lthough historical context is 
 
 189. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free 
Press, 303 F.3d 681.  This is often referred to as the experience and logic test.  See Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).  The government in both Detroit Free 
Press and North Jersey Media Group argued that the federal government should receive great 
deference in control over its borders.  See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202; Detroit Free 
Press, 303 F.3d at 685-87.  More specifically, the Court has declared that “[i]mmigration includes 
substantive laws over who may enter or remain in this country, laws governing procedural aspects 
of immigration hearings, and regulations on the mechanics of deportation.” Detroit Free Press, 
303 F.3d at 686-687.  As indicated in the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 
throughout its jurisprudence in the area of immigration, the Supreme Court has treated the 
authority that Congress holds differently with regard to procedural laws than it does with regard 
to substantive laws.  “The Supreme Court has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully to 
limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting the Government special deference.”  
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687-688.  Therefore, the court in Detroit Free Press refused to 
defer to the Attorney General’s discretion regarding our national borders.  Id. at 688. 
 190. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
 191. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 192. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). 
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 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 700-704. 
 196. Id. at 700. 
 197. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
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important, a brief historical tradition might be sufficient to establish a First 
Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to that 
process are overwhelming and uncontradicted.”198  Although deportation 
hearings lack a common law tradition of openness, the court held the history of 
openness sufficient to satisfy the experience prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers test.199 
Next, Judge Keith turned his attention to the history of openness in 
deportation proceedings.  The general policy toward deportation proceedings 
has traditionally been one of openness.200  Administrative proceedings have 
evolved to embrace open hearings in most cases and particularly in the case of 
deportation hearings.201  He noted that “[s]ince 1965, INS regulations have 
explicitly required deportation proceedings to be presumptively open.”202  
Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes that explicitly close exclusion 
hearings, but leave deportation proceedings open.203  The government argued 
that the closure of exclusion hearings and the openness of deportation 
proceedings indicated that Congress sought to give the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) discretion over closure of deportation hearings.204  
Judge Keith disagreed, stating that “it would have been easy enough for 
Congress expressly to state that the Attorney General had such discretion with 
respect to deportation hearings.  But it did not.”205  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act is full of examples that specifically grant the Attorney General 
discretion.206  It is clear that in choosing not to grant the Attorney General the 
right to close deportation hearings to the public, Congress concluded that the 
hearings should be open to the public.207  Judge Keith reasoned that a history 
of openness that dates back to the creation of the deportation proceeding 
satisfied the Richmond Newspapers’ experience prong of the test.208 
b. The Logic Prong 
When looking at the substantive question of whether or not access to 
deportation proceedings plays a positive role, the Sixth and the Third Circuits 
disagree as to the appropriate outcome.  Judge Keith concluded that public 
 
 198. Id. at 701. 
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 202. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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access to deportation proceedings has had a positive effect.209  He stated, 
“First, public access acts as a check on the actions of the Executive by assuring 
us that proceedings are conducted fairly and properly.”210  In light of the 
unlimited authority that the government does exercise in relation to deportation 
hearings, public access must act as a check to any abusive government 
practice.211  Second, public access will ensure that government “does its job 
properly.”212  Openness and public access will prevent mistakes and ensure 
that the government acts formally and carefully in order to prevent public 
disapproval.213  It is likely that public access would work to ensure the proper 
execution of this country’s immigration laws and deportation proceedings.214  
Third, openness of deportation proceedings is necessary for “therapeutic” 
purposes, as an outlet for community concerns, hostility and emotions, 
especially after September 11, 2001.215  Judge Keith further stated that 
“openness enhances the perception of integrity and fairness.  ‘The value of 
openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have 
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed . . . .’”216  Finally, he 
noted that “public access helps ensure that ‘the individual citizen can 
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
government.’”217  Access to deportation proceedings informs the public of the 
government’s actions directly.218  “Direct knowledge of how . . . government is 
operating enhances the public’s ability to affirm or protest government’s 
efforts. . . .  When government selectively chooses what information it allows 
the public to see, it can become a powerful tool for deception.”219  After 
evaluating the considerable evidence of the positive impact of access, the court 
concluded that the logic portion of the inquiry was satisfied.220 
Application of the Richmond Newspapers standard to deportation 
proceedings led Judge Keith to conclude that deportation proceedings enjoy 
qualified First Amendment protection.221  While the First Amendment will 
now provide protection for members of the public seeking access to a 
deportation proceeding, this right is not absolute.  The government may still 
 
 209. Id. at 703. 
 210. Id. at 703-04. 
 211. Id. at 704. 
 212. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S., 501, 508 (1984)). 
 217. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 
596, 604 (1982)). 
 218. Id. at 704-05. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 705. 
 221. Id. 
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restrict access to protected information if the limitation passes the strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
B. Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard in the Sixth Circuit 
Under the applicable strict scrutiny analysis, when access to information is 
protected by the First Amendment, the government may not restrict that access 
unless there is a compelling state interest and the restriction is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.222  Additionally, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
demands that any compelling government interest be “‘articulated along with 
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the 
closure order was properly entered.’”223  In order for any restriction on the 
right of access to pass scrutiny, both of these prongs must be satisfied.224  
Judge Keith determined that, although the government interest in national 
security is compelling, the Creppy Directive was not narrowly tailored to serve 
national security interests; further, the government had not provided any 
particularized findings to that end.225 
1. A Compelling Government Interest 
The government argued that the “‘[c]losure of removal proceedings in 
special interest cases is necessary to protect national security by safeguarding 
the Government’s investigation of the September 11 terrorist attack and other 
terrorist conspiracies.’”226  More specifically, the government stated that any 
information including the names of the special interest detainees as well as the 
place and date of arrest satisfies the compelling government interest 
requirement.227  Public disclosure could cause any ongoing investigation to be 
disrupted because such disclosure would alert terrorist organizations of the 
arrests.228  This could lead to intimidation of potential witnesses and might 
deter the detainees from cooperating, both of which would hamper the 
government’s investigation.229  Furthermore, public access could reveal the 
direction of the investigation or could invite terrorist organizations to interfere 
with pending proceedings by creating false evidence intended to mislead the 
government.230  If public access were allowed in deportation hearings in 
special cases, “‘[b]its and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in 
isolation,’ but used by terrorist groups to help form a ‘bigger picture’ of the 
 
 222. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07). 
 223. Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. (quoting U.S. Government Brief at 46). 
 227. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705-06. 
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Government’s terrorism investigation, would be disclosed.”231  There is an 
additional fear of the stigma that the special interest detainees would 
experience if their names were divulged to the public, even if they were found 
not to have any connection to terrorism.232  The Sixth Circuit deferred to the 
judgment of the government regarding its ongoing investigation in the realm of 
terrorism.233  The Court stated, “These agents are certainly in a better position 
to understand the contours of the investigation and the intelligence capabilities 
of terrorist organizations.”234 
2. Narrow Tailoring 
As mentioned earlier, the government must prove both a compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring to pass strict scrutiny.235  Specific findings must 
be produced on the record so that “a reviewing court can determine whether 
closure was proper and whether less restrictive alternatives exist.”236  In 
Detroit Free Press, Judge Keith noted that “[t]he Government offers no 
persuasive argument as to why the Government’s concerns cannot be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis.”237  He stated that in camera review before 
the closure of any particular proceeding would likely provide as much security 
as the Creppy Directive.238  The government had argued that sensitive 
information would be revealed if the closure were limited to a case-by-case 
basis.239  Essentially, the government feared that any release of information, no 
matter how unimportant it might seem at the time, might give terrorist groups 
some insight.240  Judge Keith contended that this information is already 
capable of being released to the public by the detainees themselves, whose 
speech the government is unable to restrict; therefore, he concluded, the names 
of various detainees are likely to be released anyway.241  Further, the 
government has a wide range of control over deportation proceedings and need 
only release very little information in order to prove its case.242  Despite the 
government’s substantial concerns, Judge Keith concluded that the government 
failed to provide particularized findings that the Creppy Directive was 
 
 231. Id. (quoting affidavit submitted in support of U.S. Government’s position). 
 232. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 706. 
 233. Id. at 707. 
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narrowly tailored.243  He concluded, “[W]e do not believe speculation should 
form the basis for such a drastic reduction of the public’s First Amendment 
rights.”244  As a result, the court upheld the District Court’s injunction on the 
imposition of the Creppy Directive in Haddad’s deportation case, finding that 
there is a presumptive right of openness and that the standard of strict scrutiny 
had not been satisfied in this case.245 
IV.  NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT 
Like Detroit Free Press, the dispute in North Jersey Media Group 
involved a First Amendment challenge to the Creppy Directive.  After the New 
Jersey Law Journal and Herald News were repeatedly denied access to 
information about deportation proceedings pending in Newark’s Immigration 
Court, the newspapers filed an action claiming a violation of their First 
Amendment rights.246  The District Court followed the two-part Richmond 
Newspapers test and found that the First Amendment provides a qualified right 
of access to deportation proceedings.247  The court concluded that the 
presumptive right of access as well as the innumerable similarities between 
judicial proceedings and deportation proceedings supported the existence of 
that right.248  The District Court also determined that the Creppy Directive was 
unconstitutional because it called for a blanket closure of the proceedings and 
was not narrowly tailored to serve the interests of national security.249  The 
government subsequently appealed the District Court’s decision, and the Third 
Circuit granted expedited review of the government’s appeal but refused to 
grant a stay of the District Court’s injunction.250 
 
 243. Id. at 710. 
 244. Id. at 709.  The government contended that it has in place an interim rule that restrains 
the deportees from communicating information for an “indefinite period of time.”  Id. at 708.  
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until vacated by the Immigration Judge.’  It also provides that ‘(a)ny information submitted 
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A. The Richmond Newspapers Standard in the Third Circuit 
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit chose to apply the Richmond 
Newspapers standard rather than that enunciated in Houchins.251  Judge Becker 
concluded, “Given that a majority of the Supreme Court has applied the 
Richmond Newspapers framework to pretrial proceedings and voir dire 
examinations, that approach clearly is not confined to the criminal trial itself, 
although each of the Supreme Court’s applications has arisen in the criminal 
context.”252  Before North Jersey Media Group, the Third Circuit had 
traditionally applied the Richmond Newspapers standard outside judicial 
proceedings.  For instance, the Third Circuit applied the Richmond 
Newspapers analysis to the question of whether there is a right of public access 
to records of a state environmental agency.253  Despite the fact that the case 
involved an administrative agency, the decision ultimately rested on the 
Richmond Newspapers test.254  Judge Becker stated, “[I]n this Court, Richmond 
Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of access to government 
proceedings, including removal.”255  Therefore, the Third Circuit, like the 
Sixth Circuit, deemed the Richmond Newspapers standard to be the appropriate 
analysis under which to determine whether access to deportation proceedings 
enjoy First Amendment protection. 
B. Application of the Two-Part Richmond Newspapers Test 
Unlike Judge Keith, Judge Becker determined that access is not 
constitutionally protected.  The court concluded that the broken, ambiguous 
history of access to deportation proceedings did not satisfy the Richmond 
Newspapers test.256  The court could have chosen to end its inquiry there, but 
chose instead to comment on the inadequacy of the logic prong as well.257  
Judge Becker stated, “We also conclude that under a logic inquiry properly 
acknowledging both community benefit and potential harms, public access 
does not serve a ‘significant positive role’ in deportation hearings.”258  In 
finding that deportation proceedings failed on both the logic and experience 
prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the Third Circuit unquestionably 
determined that the First Amendment does not protect access to deportation 
proceedings. 
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1. The Experience Prong 
Judge Becker concluded that the period of history necessary to satisfy the 
experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers analysis is an open question to 
be decided in favor of a long, uninterrupted history in cases involving 
deportation proceedings.259  He stated, “The Newspapers contend, quite 
correctly, that at least within the geographic confines of the Third Circuit, a 
showing of openness at common law is not required.”260  Although the court 
agreed that a showing of common-law history is not required, the court would 
not ignore the experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers inquiry in cases 
where history is “ambiguous or lacking.”261  The court noted that “[r]elaxing 
the Richmond Newspapers experience requirement would lead to perverse 
consequences” in deportation proceedings.262  It is the Third Circuit’s belief 
that there needs to be a more rigorous experience test in order to protect 
administrative agencies’ ability to promulgate their rules.263  Becker argued 
that administrative agencies should be able to conduct their businesses behind 
closed doors in order to insure that they operate more smoothly.264  He wrote, 
“By insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the Richmond 
Newspapers test, we preserve administrative flexibility and avoid 
constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially unconsidered, executive 
decisions.”265 
With this in mind, Judge Becker required extensive historical evidence to 
support openness in deportation proceedings.266  He noted, “While we 
acknowledge a current presumption of openness in most deportation 
proceedings, we find that this presumption has neither the pedigree nor 
uniformity necessary to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers’s first prong.”267  
The Third Circuit found that there is extensive and compelling evidence that 
the Framers rejected an unqualified right of access to the functions of the 
political branches.268  First, the court noted that the first Congress did not open 
its proceedings and floor hearings to the public.269  Even today the majority of 
Congressional activity takes place behind closed doors.270  As a second 
example of a closed administrative proceeding, the court stated that, because of 
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the sensitive information released during the process, social security 
proceedings are closed to the public regardless of the impact.271  The 
government provided examples of more then a dozen administrative 
proceedings that are presumptively closed to the public.272 
The Third Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that 
deportation proceedings have traditionally been open to the public and press.273  
The court stated, “[B]ased on both Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
precedents, the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and 
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”274  The court 
rejected the newspaper’s argument that Congress’s practice of closing 
exclusion proceedings while refraining from closing deportation proceedings 
indicated that Congress intended that these proceedings remain presumptively 
open to the public.275  The court asserted that there is evidence to indicate 
specifically that deportation proceedings have been closed to the public.276  
The government had often held deportation proceedings in areas that are 
traditionally closed off to the public such as prisons, hospitals, and even 
private homes.277  Hearings involving abused alien children are closed to the 
public by regulation.278  The Third Circuit concluded that without the “gloss of 
history” gained only by an extensive history of access, deportation proceedings 
were unable to satisfy the experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers 
test.279  Furthermore, the Third Circuit maintained that historical access to 
deportation proceedings did not lend itself to the favorable judgment of 
experience.280  In light of this evidence, Judge Becker concluded that the 
experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers standard had failed in the 
context of deportation proceedings. 
2. The Logic Prong 
The Third Circuit considered the logic prong ineffective when used in the 
Richmond Newspapers standard.  The court noted: 
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[I]n the jurisprudence developed thus far, the logic prong does not appear to do 
much work in the Richmond Newspapers approach, for we have not found a 
case in which a proceeding passed the experience test through its history of 
openness [and] yet failed the logic test by not serving community values.281 
To rectify this problem, the Third Circuit chose to consider both the 
negative and positive implications of access.  Judge Becker argued that this 
approach would help the logic prong gain more force in the Richmond 
Newspapers analysis.282 
With the negative consequences of access in mind, the gloss of history 
must have had a favorable impact on that particular proceeding.283  Judge 
Becker ultimately agreed with Judge Keith that access to deportation 
proceedings has had a favorable impact on the process.  However, Judge 
Becker concluded that the negative impact of access far outweighs the 
favorable impact.284  The Third Circuit has identified six values typically 
served by openness: 
“[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing 
the public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; [2] 
promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by 
permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a significant 
community therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and 
emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial 
process to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all involved; 
and [the] [6] discouragement of perjury.”285 
While Judge Becker noted that access to deportation proceedings would 
serve as a positive influence, he concluded that the threat to national security 
was too great.286  He cautioned, “First, public hearings would necessarily 
reveal sources and methods of investigation . . . which . . . allows a terrorist 
organization to build a picture of the investigation.”287  Second, deportation 
proceedings might reveal how a given deportee entered our country illegally.288  
He stated that “putting entry information into the public realm regarding all 
‘special interest cases’ would allow the terrorist organization to see patterns of 
entry, what works and what doesn’t.”289  Third, there is a fear that open 
deportation proceedings will reveal what evidence the government lacks in its 
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war against terrorism.290  “Fourth, if a terrorist organization discovers that a 
particular member is detained, or that information about a plot is known, it 
may accelerate the timing of the planned attack, thus reducing the amount of 
time the government has to detect and prevent it.”291  Fifth, a terrorist group 
that gains knowledge about a particular proceeding might be able to create 
false information and evidence.292  Access would slow investigations and 
undermine the government’s efforts against terrorism.293  Sixth, detainees’ 
personal safety might become an issue if their identity is made known to the 
public.294  The court concluded that national security interests at stake in the 
case of deportation proceedings clearly outweigh the positive attributes 
associated with access.295 
Judge Becker decided that deportation proceedings did not satisfy the 
Richmond Newspapers’ experience and logic test, and therefore, the First 
Amendment does not protect public access to deportation proceedings.296  
Judge Keith, on the other hand, determined that deportation proceedings did 
pass the Richmond Newspapers’ experience and logic test, and therefore, the 
hearings enjoy qualified First Amendment protection.297  In his view, the 
government may close deportation proceedings without violating the First 
Amendment if its methods are narrowly tailored; importantly, the Creppy 
Directive is far too broad and therefore is unconstitutional.298 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The two-part Richmond Newspapers standard has been left in a state of 
ambiguity and confusion by the Supreme Court.  In approaching right of access 
cases, lower courts have failed to apply the Richmond Newspapers standard 
consistently.299  Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group illustrate 
this difficulty in their inability to agree on the relative importance of the two 
factors.  While both Circuits applied the two-pronged Richmond Newspapers 
standard, each judge’s application of that standard led to divergent 
conclusions.  These differences of opinion indicate a larger problem with the 
Richmond Newspapers standard.  Without further guidance from the Supreme 
Court, each court has enjoyed significant flexibility in the application of the 
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standard.  Increased judicial discretion becomes a problem during times of 
stress when external pressure might affect decision-making.300 
The Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond Newspapers two-pronged test 
correctly when Judge Keith concluded that the public enjoys a qualified First 
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings.  The experience and 
logic portions of the test are satisfied with respect to deportation proceedings 
when one considers the test in the context in which it was created.  The First 
Amendment will support a right of access in order to fulfill its core purpose of 
informed public debate.301  The experience and logic test was considered a 
practical limitation on that right.302  A reviewing court should evaluate the 
history of access to determine if access implies the favorable judgment of 
experience to that particular proceeding.303  Equally important is the reviewing 
court’s approach to the logic portion of the two-pronged test.  Detroit Free 
Press accurately portrays the way that the Richmond Newspapers test should 
be applied. 
A. Richmond Newspapers Should Be Applied to Deportation Proceedings 
In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stevens wrote, 
“Today . . . for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary 
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the 
freedoms of speech . . . protected by the First Amendment.”304  Although it is 
clear that the Supreme Court issued a watershed opinion in Richmond 
Newspapers, it failed to take the important step of overturning past cases that 
refused to grant such a right.  Houchins and Richmond Newspapers are 
inconsistent with one another and the Court has failed to provide guidance on 
how the conflict should be resolved.  The distinction is undeniably important.  
If the reviewing court in either North Jersey Media Group or Detroit Free 
Press had chosen to apply the standard articulated in Houchins, there is no 
question that the public and the press would not have access to deportation 
proceedings.  However, both Judge Keith and Judge Becker correctly 
concluded that the standard articulated in the Richmond Newspapers opinion 
should apply to the present question of access to deportation proceedings.  This 
is true for two reasons: (1) Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the 
application of Richmond Newspapers outside the context of a criminal trial, 
and (2) Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group are factually similar 
to the Richmond Newspapers decision and can be distinguished from 
Houchins. 
 
 300. Olson, supra note 10, at 488. 
 301. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
 302. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 303. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 304. Id. at 583. 
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Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of 
whether the First Amendment protects access outside the context of a criminal 
trial, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny support the expansion of 
protection.  Justice Brennan has consistently advocated an expansive view of 
First Amendment protection.305  A structural interpretation of the First 
Amendment supports access to government information to ensure that public 
debate of important issues will be informed.306  The court should not focus on 
the type of proceeding at issue in a particular dispute, but rather on whether 
access to that proceeding or information would support informed public 
debate.307  Lower courts have interpreted Richmond Newspapers and its 
progeny to provide a right of access that extends beyond the confines of the 
criminal proceeding.308  Several circuit courts have agreed that the application 
of Richmond Newspapers is appropriate not only in civil cases, but also in 
administrative proceedings.309 
The application of Richmond Newspapers is appropriate in both Detroit 
Free Press and North Jersey Media Group because both cases are factually 
distinguishable from Houchins.  Justice Brennan admitted that “the First 
Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an 
equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access to 
information.”310  Citing Houchins specifically to support that proposition, 
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the First Amendment might not grant a 
right of access in every situation, including prison facilities.311  Justice Burger 
noted in his majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers that “penal 
institutions . . . by definition, are not ‘open’ or public places.”312  Access to 
government information when that information has historically been available 
to the public is important to support the informed public debate.313  Unlike the 
penal institutions at issue in Houchins, deportation proceedings are factually 
distinguishable because they have traditionally been open to the public.314 
Additionally, deportation proceedings are far more similar to the criminal 
trial at issue in Richmond Newspapers than the prison system at issue in 
Houchins.  A deportation proceeding is “analogous to a trial held within the 
 
 305. See id. at 584-89. 
 306. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 307. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982). 
 308. William Taylor, The Sixth Circuit Holds that the First Amendment Provides a Limited 
Right of Public Access to Deportation Hearings, 56 SMU L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2003). 
 309. Id. at 1054. 
 310. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585. 
 311. Id. at 586. 
 312. Id. at 577 n.11. 
 313. Id. at 589. 
 314. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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judicial branch.”315  Like a criminal or civil proceeding, a deportee must 
receive notice of the deportation proceeding.316  Evidence can be presented by 
both parties and the deportee has the right to cross examine all witnesses.317  
The deportee may appeal the decision by the immigration judge.318  “[T]hough 
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship 
on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this 
land of freedom.”319  Like a criminal proceeding, the severity of punishment 
attached to a deportation proceeding lends itself to the conclusion that 
deportation proceedings are important sources of public interest.320  The First 
Amendment supports the idea that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”321  As an issue of great public interest, it 
is important that the courts apply the Richmond Newspapers experience and 
logic standard to determine whether deportation proceedings enjoy First 
Amendment protection. 
B. The Two-Part Richmond Newspapers Test 
As noted, the application of the two-part standard is difficult in light of its 
present ambiguity.  Pending a decision from the Supreme Court, the lower 
courts should look to Justice Brennan’s structural interpretation of the First 
Amendment for guidance in the application of the two-part standard.  The 
experience and logic test was promulgated as a practical limitation on the right 
of access.  “This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical 
necessities as it is of abstract reasoning.”322  From this perspective, it seems 
that Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit interpreted and applied the Richmond 
Newspapers standard correctly.  Judge Keith assessed the experience prong by 
evaluating whether or not deportation proceedings enjoyed “favorable 
judgment of experience.”323 Additionally, the court considered both the 
positive and negative consequence of access in the logic prong of the test.324  
In doing so, Judge Keith correctly concluded that the First Amendment confers 
a qualified right of access to deportation hearings. 
 
 315. Gabriel S. Oberfield, Press Rights in Peril: The Department of Justice Infringes Upon 
Press Liberties by Conducting “Special Interest” Removal Proceedings, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1209, 1218 (2003). 
 316. Id. at 1217. 
 317. Id. at 1218. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 322. Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 323. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
 324. Id. at 703-05. 
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1. The Experience Prong 
The basic disagreement between Judge Becker and Judge Keith 
surrounding the experience prong centers on Judge Becker’s belief that 
deportation proceedings do not have a history sufficient to satisfy the 
Richmond Newspapers standard.  Experience of openness is necessary because 
“tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experiences.”325  
As long as the history of access is sufficient to determine if the access has 
implied a favorable judgment, the history of openness should be sufficient to 
satisfy the experience standard.  This is demonstrated in Press Enterprise II 
when the Court used eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historical evidence to 
satisfy the experience portion of the test.  Despite the fact that pretrial 
proceedings lacked a common law history of access, the Court concluded that 
openness had revealed the favorable judgment of experience.326  By 
approaching the test from a structural perspective, it is clear that history of 
openness need not be as extensive as that articulated in the Richmond 
Newspapers opinion.  It is sufficient to determine whether or not access to 
deportation proceedings implies the favorable judgment of experience. The 
history need not reach common law origin in order to determine whether or not 
the proceeding has this effect. 
Although deportation proceedings lack a common law history of openness, 
the history of openness has been consistent.327  “Before the September 11 
attacks, the press and the public enjoyed a qualified right to observe 
immigration court removal proceedings.”328  Immigration judges have 
discretion to close deportation proceedings in limited circumstances.329  Based 
on the fact that immigration judges possess this discretionary power and have 
exercised it in select cases, Judge Becker concluded that the history of access 
to deportation proceedings is “inconsistent” and “ambiguous.”330  The 
immigration judge’s exercise of discretion in limited circumstances is 
insufficient to deny First Amendment protection to deportation proceedings.  
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right of access under the First 
Amendment only recognized a “qualified right of access for criminal 
proceedings, which may be restricted by a countervailing public interest.”331  
For instance, the fact that criminal proceedings are often closed to the public in 
instances of child and spousal abuse did not lead the Supreme Court to 
 
 325. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 326. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1130. 
 327. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589. 
 328. Oberfield, supra note 315, at 1218-19. 
 329. Thomas V. Ayala, Issues in the Third Circuit: Development of the First Amendment 
Right of Access to Adjudicatory Hearings in the Third Circuit: Does the Ongoing Threat of 
Terrorism Call for a Secret Justice System?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1303, 1316 (2003). 
 330. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
 331. Id. at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81). 
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conclude that access to criminal proceedings has been inconsistent or 
ambiguous.332 
Because of the fact that deportation proceedings have been presumptively 
open to the public subject to the limited discretion of the immigration judge to 
close the proceedings in select cases, the experience of openness is sufficient to 
satisfy the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test. 
2. The Logic Prong 
After determining that deportation proceedings satisfy the experience 
portion of the two-pronged test, one must also determine whether the logic 
portion of the inquiry is satisfied.  It is Justice Brennan’s determination that a 
history of openness alone was insufficient to conclude that access to particular 
government information should be afforded First Amendment protection.333  
Rather, it is crucial to consider whether access is beneficial to that particular 
process.334  If access is found to be beneficial to a particular government 
proceeding, then experience and logic will both be satisfied and the First 
Amendment will protect access to a particular proceeding. 
Both Judge Becker and Judge Keith agree with the conclusion that 
openness is beneficial to deportation proceedings.  First, the similarity between 
the deportation proceedings and criminal trials supports the conclusion that 
openness would be positive.335  More specifically, access to deportation 
proceedings would support fairness, inform the public of important 
government functions, ensure the proper execution of this country’s 
immigration laws and deportation proceedings and act as a check on any 
abusive government practice.336  Access would also provide therapeutic value 
to a community that has suffered tremendously following the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001. 
The Supreme Court promulgated the logic standard in order to consider the 
practical effect of access to a particular proceeding.337  If the practical effect of 
access is assessed more accurately by looking at both the positive and negative 
implications of access, then the true purpose of the logic standard has been 
served.  “An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must . . . be 
assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing interests 
invaded.”338  Justice Brennan therefore insists that the reviewing court 
specifically evaluate the effect of access on a particular proceeding.  Both the 
Sixth Circuit and the Third Circuit considered the negative impact that access 
 
 332. See id. at 222 n.3. 
 333. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 334. Id. at 589. 
 335. See supra notes 314-320 and accompanying text. 
 336. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 337. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 338. Id. at 588. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11 1139 
might have on deportation proceedings.  However, the Sixth Circuit and the 
Third Circuit disagreed regarding the negative impact of access.  Judge Keith 
concluded that “the government has not identified one persuasive reason why 
openness would play a negative role in the process.”339  Considering both the 
positive and negative impact of access to deportation proceedings as a whole, 
Judge Keith correctly concluded access would play a positive role.  Judge 
Keith determined that national security concerns were limited to special 
interest cases and therefore the concern was more appropriately considered as a 
compelling interest under strict scrutiny.340 
Judge Becker disagreed with Judge Keith’s application and chose instead 
to consider national security in the logic portion of the Richmond Newspapers 
analysis.341  Citing extensive evidence that open deportation proceedings 
would threaten national security, Judge Becker concluded that the logic portion 
of the Richmond Newspapers analysis had failed.  However, this conclusion 
was reached erroneously because “[a]t this stage, we must consider the value 
of openness in deportation hearings generally, not its benefits and detriments in 
‘special interest’ deportation hearings in particular.”342  Considerations that are 
particular to a small sub-class of deportation proceedings rather than 
deportation proceedings as a whole should be evaluated when the court 
engages in a strict scrutiny analysis.343  Though national security is an 
important consideration for special interest cases, it generally is not applicable 
to all deportation proceedings.  “There are many grounds for deportation—
marriage fraud, moral turpitude convictions, and aggravated felonies, to name 
a few—that do not ordinarily implicate national security.”344  Because of the 
fact that national security concerns do not affect the majority of deportation 
proceedings, but rather such concerns are unique to a small number of 
proceedings, national security concerns should be addressed when the court 
engages in a strict scrutiny analysis.345 
This conclusion is clearly grounded in the Supreme Court’s right of access 
precedent.  In Globe Newspaper, the Court considered the effect of open 
access on criminal trials in general and not those involving minor sex 
victims.346  After deciding that the public had a First Amendment right of 
access in criminal proceedings, the Court concluded that the state may close 
the rape cases involving minor victims on a case-by-case basis.347  The First 
 
 339. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705. 
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 342. Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment right of access is a qualified right that may be restricted if a 
compelling government interest exists and the government narrowly tailors the 
restriction to meet that interest.  However, a compelling government interest 
that is present in a few, easily-identifiable cases is not sufficient to restrict 
access to deportation proceedings as a whole.  Therefore, the Third Circuit was 
wrong in its denial of a First Amendment right of access to deportation 
proceedings.  The Sixth Circuit was correct in its conclusion that both the 
experience and logic portion of the Richmond Newspapers test was satisfied 
with respect to deportation proceedings, despite national security concerns. 
C. Strict Scrutiny 
It has been sufficiently established that the public should enjoy a 
constitutional right of access under the First Amendment.  Not only is the 
Richmond Newspapers test correctly applied in Detroit Free Press, it is clearly 
satisfied with respect to deportation proceedings.  The Sixth Circuit validly 
concluded that the First Amendment affords the press and public a qualified 
right to deportation proceedings.  However, the government may regulate and 
restrict access to information if it has a compelling government interest and the 
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.348  The strict scrutiny 
analysis ensures that the government will be able to protect its compelling 
interests while protecting individual First Amendment rights. 
The government claimed that national security is a compelling reason to 
close deportation proceedings in special interest cases.  The government 
argued that “[c]losure of removal proceedings in special interest cases is 
necessary to protect national security by safeguarding the Government’s 
investigation of the September 11 terrorist attack and other terrorist 
conspiracies.”349  In light of the government’s interest in national security, 
especially in cases of terrorism, the Sixth Circuit was justified in deferring to 
the government’s assertion that open deportation proceedings implicate 
national security concerns.  “Courts have consistently recognized the need for 
‘heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to 
matters of national security’ when ‘terrorism or other special circumstances’ 
are at issue.”350  However, “deference is not a basis for abdicating our 
responsibilities under the First Amendment.”351  Therefore, the government 
must make specific findings that the Creppy Directive is narrowly tailored in 
order to shield First Amendment right of access. 
 
 348. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. 
 349. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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While the government’s interest in national security is compelling, it does 
not provide the basis for broad restriction of access in all cases the Attorney 
General deems special interest cases.  The Supreme Court and the First 
Amendment require that the government narrowly tailor its restrictions in order 
to protect First Amendment interests.  Closure is only appropriate if 
“‘reasonable alternatives to closure’ are not available to protect the 
government’s interests.”352  The court should not support a government 
restriction unless that restriction clearly serves national security interests.  
Detroit Free Press correctly concluded that the government failed to narrow its 
restriction carefully.  The Creppy Directive fails to secure the government’s 
interest and fails to recognize that closure could be handled on a case-by-case 
basis.  Therefore, the Creppy Directive is an unconstitutional restriction on the 
public’s right of access to deportation proceedings. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: A VALID COMPROMISE 
Despite the circumstances under which Detroit Free Press and North 
Jersey Media Group reached the Third and Sixth Circuits, it is clear that the 
conflict can be resolved by a closer look at the principles articulated in the 
Richmond Newspapers opinion.  When Justice Brennan issued his 
groundbreaking concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, he was ultimately 
concerned that a structural view of the First Amendment would create a 
limitless right of access.353  The practical limitations inherent in a limitless 
right would have burdened the political branches.  Therefore, Justice Brennan 
restricted this right by creating the experience and logic test.  This limitation is 
meant to assess the practical limitations of allowing access to a particular 
proceeding.354  At times of national crisis, like September 11, it is easy to 
forget the importance of a right of access and the civil rights that Richmond 
Newspapers serves to protect.  Judge Keith applied the Richmond Newspapers 
standard correctly and recognized a qualified right of access to deportation 
proceedings.355  This opinion considers national security interests without 
unduly burdening First Amendment liberties. 
Judge Becker is validly concerned that free and open access to all 
deportation proceedings might jeopardize national security in particular cases.  
However, it is important that the judiciary balance the interest in national 
security with First Amendment rights.  As George W. Bush so poignantly 
noted in the days following the September 11 attacks: “We are in a fight for 
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our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.”356  Judge Keith 
accurately captures the balance between national security and civil liberties by 
allowing public access to deportation proceedings.  By eliminating broad 
closures of special interest cases, individual First Amendment freedoms are 
guarded while cases posing a specific and demonstrated risk to national 
security will remain closed to the public. 
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